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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KOPPERS COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ACORD-HARRIS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a corporation and 
FIREMAN'S FUND, a corporation. 
Defendants-Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Civil No. 15612 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff subcontractor 
for monies due under a subcontrac~ with a counterclaim by 
the defendant general contractor for damages for breach of 
the subcontract. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon motion of the plaintiff the court granted a 
Partial Summary Judgment from which the defendants appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek reversal of the Partial Summary 
Judgment. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since this is an appeal from an Order granting J 
Partial Summary Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, the 
facts should be considered most favorably to the Defend-
ants in this case. 
Defendant Acord-Harris Construction Company had a 
contract with the Utah State Building Board for the con-
struction of the Dee Special Events Center on the campus 
of Weber State College in Ogden, Utah. (R. 1) Plaintiff 
Koppers Company, Inc. was the subcontractor under a writ-
ten subcontract agreement with the Defendant whereby 
Koppers agreed to furnish and install a wood dome for the 
Dee Special Events Center at a contract price of $766,168. 
The subcontract is attached to the Complaint. (R. l, 4) 
Plaintiff Koppers claims in the Complaint filed in 
April 1977, that it has completed its subcontract obliga-
tions, that the Defendant Acord-Harris has failed to pay 
the sum of $150, 678 and that the Defendant Acord-Harris is 
in breach of the subcontract. (R. 2) 
The Defendants Acord-Harris and Fireman's Fund In-
surance Company, the surety on the project for Acord-Harrie, 
deny that the Plaintiff has completed the subcontract, deni· 
that the Plaintiff has owing to it the sum of $150, 678, 011 '0 
deny that Acord-Harris has breached the subcontract. The 
Defendants allege affirmatively in their Answer and also b~ 
Counterclaim, that (a) the Plaintiff breached the subcort' 
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in not bringing to the attention of the contractor and the 
architect engineer the fact that the Plaintiff's design 
of the roof Dome and the owners design of the supporting 
truss were not compatible, thus requiring a redesign of a 
more costly truss; which in turn damaged the Defendant in 
the amount of $76,646; and (b) that the Plaintiff further 
breached the subcontract in providing erroneous engineering 
information which resulted in an additional $20,000 in dam-
ages to the Acord-Harris Construction Company. (R. 15, 16, 
18-20) In said Counterclaim the Defendant also seeks 
attorney's fees and "such other relief" as the court deems 
just. (R. 24, 25) 
In July 1977 Defendant Acord-Harris in Answers to 
Interrogatories, reduced the $20,000 damage claim to a 
figure of $12,320. (R. 38) 
In August 1977 the Defendants filed their Request 
for Production Documents for Inspection and Copying, re-
questing information concerning the material and labor costs 
associated with the first truss design and second truss de-
sign and also concerning other relevant matters. (R. 89-93) 
The Plaintiff's production was incomplete (R. 101-105), and 
the Defendant filed a Motion to Compel Discovery, seeking 
appropriate answers to said requests. (R. 106-109) 
Thereafter on November 8, 1977 the Plaintiff filed 
a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment claiming that Judg-
rnent should be entered in the amount of $54, 032. (R. 113) 
-3-
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On November 11, 1977 the Court entered u.n Order requinn:i 
the Plaintiff to appcu.r November 28, to there furnish tlic: 
required documents (R. 114) and to at that hearing oprn 
files and submit to an exchange of documents. The Plain-
tiff also submitted a request for production of documents. 
(:K. 116-118) 
Thereafter on November 23, 1977 the Defendants file 
the only affidavit in this matter. (R. 119-112) In this 
affidavit the Defendant's general manager M. L. Harris, 
stated that the figures previously given in the pleadings 
were not complete in that they did not include the completf 
supervision and management costs, consequential costs, en-
gineering cost to be paid to Reaveley Engineers, and possi-
ble delay damages covering a period for anywhere from 15 tc 
30 days at $500 a day. These costs would increase the 
amount in issue in the action. (R. 119, 121) The affidavit 
further stated that the pleaded costs did not reflect all 
of the costs, and that additional discovery is necessary 
to determine the total costs incurred by the defendant. 
(R. 121) 
The affidavit further states that the written 
approval of the structural adequacy of the Dome had not 
been given by the owner, that the contract between Acord-
Harris and the owner, and the contract between the Defen-
dant Acord-Harris and the Plaintiff Koppers have not been 
fully performed; and that further measures may yet b0 r~ 
-4-
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qui1cd to insure the structural adequacy of the Dome at a 
cost to Defendant Acord-Harris, not yet possible to deter-
mine. (R. 121, 122) 
On December 5, 1977 the trial court granted the 
Plaintiff's motion for a Partial Summary Judgment, in the 
amount of $60,862 (R. 120) stating that, 
"Nothing in this Judgment shall affect 
Plaintiff's right to claim the remaining 
amount alleged by Plaintiff to be due and 
owing on said contract, to which Defendants 
claim an offset ... that Plaintiffs claim for 
interest on said amount is reserved until time 
of trial." 
The Court further stated, 
" ... That the Defendants' Motion to 
Compel Discovery is granted and that both 
... (parties) ... are ordered to exchange doc-
uments on December 15, 1977 at the office 
of Plaintiff's counsel." 
This Order was signed December 5, 1977 and filed December 
7, 1977 by District Judge J. Duffy Palmer. (R. 128,129) 
The transcript of the Record for the hearing on 
lhe Motion for Partial Summary Judgment includes no evidence 
but merely reports the statements by both counsel in sup-
port of their positions. (R. 156-165) Defendant's coun-
sel argued that there are additional bills and additional 
costs which have not yet been developed through discovery. 
Plaintiff's counsel argued that there is no issue about 
the $60,862. The trial judge briefly commented on his 
reason for granting the Judgment (R. 161, 166, 167), stating, 
-'i-
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"That Court has read the filings and 
the pleadings, the responses to discovery 
in the file. It seems very speculative that 
these things might come up even in counsels 
arguments that these things aren't specula-
tive because they might come up. 
It's the Judgment of the Court that 
Judgment will be rendered for the $60,862. 
The rest of it, remaining to be argued and 
discussed at the time of the trial or be-
tween the parties after the discovery is 
completed and each of you have had an oppor-
tunity to answer your interrogatories." 
(R. 167) 
Concerning the production of documents, the Court then 
stated: 
"Of course, the Judgment again, the 
Motion to Compel is granted and they should 
be complete by December 15th." (R. 167) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL FACT ISSUES 
PRECLUDE THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The basic concept in the review of the Sununary 
Judgment proceedings has been repeatedly stated by this 
Court in a number of cases, one of which is fairly r .. pre-
sentative: 
"A Summary Judgment must be supported 
by evidence, admission and inferences which 
when viewed in the light most favorable shows 
that, 'There is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving pary is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' 
Such showing must preclude all reasonable 
possibility that the loser could, if given 
a trial, produce evidence which would reason-
ably sustain a judgment in his favor." 
Bulloch vs. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 
11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559. 
See also Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. which gives us the b~sic 1 ~' 
6 
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"The Judgment sought shall be rendered 
for~hwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, to-
gether with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law ... " 
The issue to be decided is whether or not there 
are any substantial issues of fact which should be tried. In 
Tanner vs. Utah Poultry and Farmers Cooperative, 11 Utah 
2d 353, 359 P.2d 18 this Court stated: 
"Summary Judgment is appropriate only 
where the favored party makes a showing which 
precludes, as a matter of law, the awarding 
of any relief to the losing party." See also 
Morris vs. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 
P.2d 297. 
Thus in the subject case Appellants believe that 
the trial judge could not say as a matter of law that de-
fendants would not be entitled to any further damages at 
trial. 
A. The Pleadings, Answers to Interrogatories and 
the Defendants' Affidavit Present Fact Issues. 
A brief summary of the relevant portions of the 
Complaint, Counterclaim, Answers to Interrogatories and 
Affidavit indicates quite clearly that there are fact 
questions which defendants are entitled to present to the 
trial court: 
The Complaint alleges that the Subcontract has 
been completed, that the full contract price of $776,000 
is owing, that the Defendant Acord-Harris has breached 
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that contract and that the Plaintiff is entitled to the 
unpaid balance of $150,678. (R. 15, 16) 
On the contrary Defendants in their Answer and 
Counterclaim deny that the Subcontract has been completed, 
deny that the full contract price is owing, deny that 
Acord-Harris has breached the Contract, and that the Plain· 
tiff is entitled to the unpaid balance. 
Therefore in the pleadings alone we have fact 
issues concerning completion of the Contract, breach of 
the Contract and the amount of dollars which would be owin'] 
under the Contract. 
In the Counterclaim the defendants claim offsets 
for two specific breaches allegedly committed by the Plilin-
tiff involving $76,646 and $20,000 in damamges. (R. 15, 
16, 18-20) By Answers to Interrogatories defendants fur-
ther reduce the $20,000 figure to $12,230. (R. 38) 
Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. provides, 
"The adverse party prior to the day of 
hearing may serve opposing Affidavits." 
On November 23, 1977, five days prior to the hear 
ing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, defendant served 
such an affidiavit. The Affidavit states that there wil~ 
be additional offseting damages and that the previous duni-
age figures given were not complete. (R. 121) Among 
those additional items which would increase the offset 
were additional supervision costs, additional man<HJCIDLnt c~'· 
ad 
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consequential costs, engineering costs and possible delay 
damages assessed at $500 a day for a period of from 15 to 
30 days which would be charged against the Plaintiff. 
Thus considering the Complaint, Answer and Counter-
claim, Answers to Interrogatories along with the Affidavit 
the evidence shows that there are not only offsets of 
$76,646 & $12,230, but also additional costs which have 
yet to be determined, and which if and when they are deter-
mined will further reduce any amount which may ultimately 
be payable to the Plaintiff. If is clear therefore that 
if the Defendants are given a trial there is a reasonable 
probability, according to the Affidavit, that additional 
damages would be awarded to the Defendants. As the Court 
stated in Holbrook Company vs. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1975), 
" ..• it only takes one sworn statement 
under oath to dispute the averments on the 
other side of the controversy and create 
an issue of fact. This is analogous to the 
elemental rule that the fact trier may believe 
one witness as against many or many against 
one .... "; 
and in Disabled American Veterans vs. Hendrixson, 9 Utah 
2d 152, 340 P.2d 416 
" ... if then any material facts asserted 
by the plaintiff are contradicted by the de-
fendant, the facts as stated by the defendant 
must, on such motion be taken as true." 
The Defendant's claim had to be asserted as a com-
pulsory Counterclaim because it claimed damages arising 
out of the same subcontract performance which was the 
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basis for the Plaintiff's claim. It should also be noted 
that at the filing of the Complaint in April 1977 and 
even continuing up to the Affidavit in November 1977, 
neither the Subcontract work nor the prime Contract betwee:i 
the State of Utah and the Defendant had been completed. 
Thus the claims and counterclaims between the Plaintiff 
and Acord-Harris had not yet been formulated to a point 
where the full extent of the Defendant's damages could 
be determined. Of course every dollar of damages suffered 
by the Defendants because of the breaches by the Plaintiff 
goes to reduce the amount, if any, ultimately found to hr.' dr;c 
by the defendants to the plaintiff after trial. 
In Burningham vs. Ott, 525 P. 2d 620 (Utah 1974) 
this Court states: 
"In Summary Judgment evidence is not 
to be viewed. The Judgment can be given 
only in case there is no dispute on a material 
evidentiary matter." 
The Court goes on to say in quoting the language 
of Justice Wade in a prior case: 
"Such showing must preclude all reason-
able possibility that the loser could, if 
given a trial produce evidence which would 
reasonably sustain a Judgment in his favor. 
"Who knows what evidence a party might 
produce if giventhe opportunity? In the 
light of the modern practice under the Rules 
of Civil Procedure, a trial is not to be by 
ambush. Instead the evidence upon which one 
relies for judgment can be and should be 
known to the opponent; and when all the evi~ 
dence is known, if there is no dispute on any 
material issue of fact the Rules provide that 
-10-
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... 
the Court may apply the law and thus term-
inate the matter, thereby conserving the time 
of the court and avoiding expense to the state 
and to the litigants." 
To grant the Partial Summary Judgment in this case, 
the Trial Court mpst disregard the defendant's Affidavit; 
otherwise the Affidavit clearly sets forth the fact that 
there will be additional costs arising out of the deficiency 
in the trusses and Dome construction. In a Summary Judg-
rnent proceeding the Trial Court is precluded from weighing 
the evidence and a Summary Judgment can only be granted 
where ... "the favored party makes a showing which precludes, 
as a matter of law, the awarding of any relief to the los-
ing party." Tanner vs. Utah Poultry and Farmer's Coopera-
tive, supra. In this case the Court had to weigh the effect 
of the Affidavit and the testimony included therein. The 
Court stated (R. 162) after Mr, Osburn, counsel for Defend-
ants, had explained the significance of the Affidavit and 
the additional costs anticipated 
"The Court has read the filings and the 
pleadings, and the responses to discovery in 
the file. It seems very speculative that these 
things might come up even in counsel's argument 
that these things aren't speculative because 
they might come up." 
It is apparent that the Trial Court is weighing 
the evidence submitted in the Affidavit and pronouncing 
judgment on the relevancy and competency of the testimony 
therein. As the Court said in Holbrook Company vs. Adams, 
supra 
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"It is not the purpose of the Sununary 
Judgment procedure to judge the credibility 
of the averments of parties, or witneses, or 
the weight of evidence. Neither is it to 
deny parties the right to a trial to resolve 
disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is 
to eliminate the time, trouble and expense 
of trial when upon any view taken of the 
facts as asserted by the party ruled against, 
he would not be entitled to prevail." 
The Affidavit states in part, (I\. 120) 
"5. That the aforesaid costs comorise 
only estimates of labor, material and o~er­
head costs, and do not include complete super-
visory and management costs, nor consequential 
costs incurred by defendant because of the 
matters at issue in this action. 
6. That the determination and dis-
covery of the full costs in issue is contin-
uing on the parts of both plaintiff and de-
fendant. 
7. That plaintiff has served defendant 
with a request for production of documents re-
lated to said costs. 
8. That defendant has served plaintiff 
a request for production of documents in part 
relating to said costs, and that defendant's 
motion to compel plaintiff to produce said 
cost documents is before this court. 
11. That defendant has not yet received 
complete bills for labor and materials from 
suppliers associated with the trusses and light 
ring, or, if complete bills have been received 
then the portions of sums billed attributable 
to matters at issue in this action are not 
apparent, so that considerable additional analy-
sis is required to determine the total sum at 
issue in this action. That the foregoing state-
mane applies to at least Neiderhouse Ornamental 
Iron Company, Anderson Lumber Company, Heat 
Rite Engineering Company and Gresham Roof. That 
until said billings are complete and/or said 
analyses are completed, the sum alleged in 
plaintiff's motion as not in issue is in fact in 
issue." 
-1?-
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Finally in paragraph 13 Aff iant states in sub-
stance that the structual adequacy of the Dorne remains 
in question, that further steps may need to be taken to 
assure adequacy of same at a cost to defendant and "that 
since said costs may yet be incurred by defendant as a 
result of actions of plaintiff as alleged in the plead-
ings, and because plaintiff's contract with defendant has 
not been performed the sum alleged as not in issue in 
plaintiff's motion is in fact an issue ... " (R. 122, 122) 
B. Incomplete Pretrial Discovery has Given Rise 
to the Substantial Fact Disputes. The extent of the De-
fendant's damages when the Motion for Summary Judgment 
was filed in November 1977 was still developing, because 
the defendant's actual costs were still accruing, the 
Subcontractor's work had not been accepted and completed, 
and the extent of the liquidation damages resulting from 
the Subcontractor's actions had not yet been asserted by 
the owner. These matters are all clearly set forth in the 
Defendant's Affidavit. (R. 119-122) Fortunately for the 
Plaintiff, and unfortunately for the Defendant, at the time 
of the Motion for Summary Judgment only the specific two 
damage figures had been compiled and determined. Even 
then it was clear that there was a difference between the 
$20,000 alleged in the Counterclaim and the reduction two 
months later to the actual figure of $12,230. To permit 
Summary Judgment at the particular instance in time when 
-13-
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these two figures had become certain, but to ignore addi-
tional accruing costs is contrary to the spirit and inteiit 
of the Summary Judgment proceedings. This court in Dupl~ 
vs. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 270, 251 P.2d 624, said 
"Upon a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the Courts ought to recognize as a minimiun, 
that the opposing party produces some evi-
dentiary matter in contradiction of the 
movant's case or specify in an Affidavit the 
reason why he can not do so. 
"Where, as in the instant case the mater-
ials presented by the moving party are sufficient 
to entitle him to a direct verdict and the oppos-
ing party fails either to offer counter affida-
vits or other materials that raise a credible 
issue or to show that he has evidence not then 
available, Summary Judgment may be rendered for 
the moving party." (underlying added) 
Thus this Court recognizes that under some circum-
stances the opposing party may not be able to produce the 
actual evidence required at the time but that said evid~ncr 
can probably be furnished in the future. Such as our own 
case. To grant a judgment on damages simply because at one 
particular point in the pretrial procedure, a definite figu: 
has been determined and at the same tine disregard the fact 
that additional amounts are yet to be determined, certainly 
is contrary to the above concept enunciated by this Court. 
See also Lee vs. Mobil Oil Corporation, 452 P.2d 857 (Kiln. 
1969) where the Kansas courts upheld the general rule that 
Summary Judgment should not be entered where the opposing 
party is proceeding with due diligence with pretrial dis-
covery. 
-14-
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Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. seems to support this con-
cept in the case of damages. The Rule permits a Partial 
summary Judgment on the issue of liability when there is 
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages, 
"A Summary Judgment Interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of 
liability alone although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages." 
The Rule does not say that an Interlocutory Judg-
ment on damages can be granted without determining the 
question of liability. The reason is obvious, since in 
almost any claim for damages the full extent of the damages 
may not develop until discovery is complete or even until 
pretrial. There has been no representation on the part 
of the defendants that the damages are fixed and that there 
will be no modifications at all between pretrial discovery 
and actual trial. The Affidavit is quite to the contrary. 
Were we to allow a Summary Judgment on damages at 
this point it would simply preclude the defendants from 
claiming any further damages as an offset to the amounts 
which may be payable to the Plaintiff. It would preclude 
the possibility of amending the Pleadings under Rule 15 
U.R.C.P. to increase damages and thus decrease the final 
amount found to be due the plaintiff. 
The determination of the quantity and reasonable-
ness of damages is one of fact to be submitted to the 
'!'rial Court. Hatch vs. Sugarhouse Finance Company, 20 
li1:11i 2d 146, 434 P.2d 758. 
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The result of allowing a Partial Summar~· Juc1g~ 1cnt 
on damages, which eliminates certain claims for damages 
but preserves the remaining question for trial is more 
in the nature of a pretrial order, since the courts are 
reluctant to grant piecemeal a?peals. The Federal Courts 
are quite clear on this point. See Leonard vs. Socony-
Vacumn Oil Company, 130 F.2d 535, (CAA 7th, 1942) where 
the Court held that a Partial Summary Judgment which eli-
minated certain claims for damages but left the remaining 
ones for determination is nothing more than a interloc-
tory order. 
"This problem of Partial Summary Judgment 
is very similar to that arising upon orders 
allowing Motions to Strike, used to eliminate 
certain matters before trial by having them 
determined preliminary to trial. The Federal 
Courts have uniformally held that Orders upon 
such motions are not, in themselves, such finul 
orders as to be appealable." 
Rule 54(b) U.R.C.P. provides in substance, that 
unless certain specific requirements are met, an order 
such as has been given here is subject to revision at any 
time before the entry of final judgment. Unless the judg-
ment makes an express determination that there is no just 
reason for delay and makes an express direction for the 
entry of judgment, that 
" ... any order or other form of 
decision however, designated, which adjud-
icates fewer than all the claims of the 
rights and liabilities of fewer than all 
the parties shall not terminate the action 
as to any of the claims or parties and tlw 
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order or other form of decision is subject 
to revision at anv time before the entry of 
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties." 
Thus in this case where liability has not been 
established on the part of the plaintiff, and even though 
the court has fixed a definite offset allowable to the 
defendant, such a decision can not be final, because 
the judgment does not dispose of one of the claims, or 
one of the parties, and is not stated in the specific 
language required under the rule. 
C. The Defendants Have Claimed Their Additional 
Damages in a Timely Manner. A brief listing of the steps 
leading up to the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Order 
issuing therefrom shows that there has been no delay 
by the defendants in setting forth facts to support addi-
tional costs. The sequence of events is as follows: 
(a) Complaint filed March 29, 1977 
(b) Answer and Counterclaim of Acord-Harris 
filed April 18, 1977 (R. 12) 
(c) Reply to Counterclaim filed May 20, 1977 
(R. 27) 
(d) Plaintiff's Interrogatories to the De-
fendant filed June 20, 1977 (R. 33) 
(e) Defendant's Answer to Plaintiff's Inter-
rogatories filed July 19, 1977 (R. 33) 
(f) Defendant's Request for the Production of 
-17-
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Documents filed August 1, 1977 (R. 89) 
(h) Plaintiff's Answer to Request for Production 
of Documents filed October 17, 1977 (R. 101) 
(i) Defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery filed 
October 26, 1977 (R. 106) 
(j) Notice of Hearing on Motion to Compel Dis-
covery filed October 26, 1977 (R. 110) 
(k) Minute Entry ordering both sides to file doc-
uments in dispute entered November 7, 1977 (R. 112) 
(1) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed 
November 9, 1977 (R. 113) 
(m) Plaintiff's Request for the Production of 
Documents filed November 16, 1977 (R. 116) 
(n} Defendant's Affidavit in Opposition to Motion 
for Summary Judgment filed November 23, 1977 (R. 119) 
(o) Hearing on Motion and Entry of Order granting 
Summary Judgment entered November 28, 1977 (R. 127) 
Thus there can be no claim that the pretrial dis-
covery has in any way been delayed by the Defendant's nor 
can there be any claim that the Defendant's have refused 
to respond to any pretrial discovery request. To the con-
trary the discovery has proceeded expeditiously and the 
Defendants, within the time provided in Rule 56, have 
filed their Affidavit in Opposition to the Motion. 
There is therefore no just reason to prejudice 
the Defendants in the presentation of their case by dis-
- 18-
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regJrding the Affidavit upon the grounds either that it 
was too late or that the trial court did not deem there 
was enough relevancy to the claims set forth therein. 
Both determinations are contrary to the purposes of the 
Sununary Judgment Rule. 
SUMMARY 
Appellants submit that Rule 56 U.R.C.P. does not 
permit a Partial Summary Judgment on one element of damages 
where pretrial discovery relating to the balance of the 
damages has not been completed. In our case the Motion to 
Compel Discovery and requiring the plaintiff to produce 
various documents and figures relating to costs and damages 
was still pending before the court at the time the Summary 
Judgment was ordered. The parties were not required to 
produce these documents until some two weeks after Sum-
mary Judgment was ordered. The Partial Summary Judgment 
should not be allowed where there are still issues of 
liability concerning breach of contract, and concerning 
the amount owing on the Contract. Nor should it be allow-
ed where the damages are still unsettled because the 
prime contract and subcontract performances have not yet 
been completed, and accepted. We think the judgment of 
the court was premature and will work a distinct hard-
ship on the defendants by precluding them from further 
development of their costs and damages, and precluding 
any amendment to their claims as discovery develops. 
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Defendants respectfully submit that the Partial 
Summary Judgment should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Elliott 
CLYDE & PRATT 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendants-
Respondents 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
